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TITLE 28, SECTION 2255 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE -
MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE:
EFFECTIVE OR INEFFECTIVE AID TO A FEDERAL PRISONER?.t
George P. Smith, 1I*
With the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948, and more particularly
the enactment of Section 2255, Congress sought to give prisoners - held in
custody under sentence of any federal court- a right to move the sentencing
court either to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence which was subject to col-
lateral attack.' Since the motion is to be made before one seeks a petition
t The author wishes to express his grateful appreciation to Professor Lester B. Orfield
of the Indiana University School of Law for his valuable suggestions and criticisms of the
original draft of this article.
* B.S. 1961, J.D. 1964, Indiana University. Teaching Associate, Indiana University
School of Law.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt
hearing thereon,' determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judg-
ment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposid was
not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there
has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the
court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring
the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or
successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered
on the motion as from the final judgment on application for a writ of
habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner
who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such
court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
(June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 967; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 114,
63 Stat. 105).
Revisory committee note.- This section restates, clarifies and simplifies
the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It
provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without
resort to habeas corpus. It has the approval of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. Its principal provisions were incorporated in H.R.
42333, 79th Congress. H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Congress.
The 1949 amendment, in the first paragraph of the section, sub-
stituted the words, "court established by Act of Congress" for "Court of
the United States." c. 139, § 114, 63 Stat. 105.
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for writ of habeas corpus, it thereby serves to restrict the very issuance of the
petition. The moving party must clearly show that the motion itself is "inade-
quate.or ineffective" before any action will be taken on a habeas corpus petition.
A labyrinth of technical problems, however, still confronts a prisoner who seeks
to apply this section and consequently gain his freedom. Foremost among these
problems confronting not only the prisoner, but the court as well, is the central
question of when a prisoner may seek to exercise the right given to him under
the section. Inextricably related to this, is the further mixed consideration of
whether such a prisoner should be allowed to proceed with the aid of counsel
and in forma pauperis, even though he has not exhausted his state remedies and
is no longer in custody and also is barred from direct action by the rule of res
adjudicata. Broadly generalized, and at times inconsistent, judicial policies in
this particular area of appellate jurisdiction also impede the efficient pursuit
and administration of the motion and cause unnecessary litigation. The logic
of the words of the section, while it should yield to the logic of realities, often-
times does not.2
The four major ways in which progress can be made in overcoming many
of the obstacles arising as a result of the section's administration may be listed
as: widespread adoption of Rule 23 and the accompanying forms recently
promulgated by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, which are easily understood by the moving party and enable the court
in turn to ascertain quickly if a proper cause under the section is warranted;
more extensive use of the discovery techniques authorized under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, with particular emphasis on utilization of the pre-
trial conference; the passage and acceptance of the new proposed revisions to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which would in fact allow the court
to perform a type of investigatory function before accepting a plea of guilty;
and a basic re-evaluation of all the pitfalls of the section by the federal courts.
The aim of this article, then, will be to assay the above problem area and
consider the validity and purpose of the remedies offered. But, before doing
this, it is most important to consider the historical beginnings of the writs of
habeas corpus and error coram nobis, for these two writs laid the groundwork
upon which Section 2255 was built.
I. THE ISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SECTION 2255
Despite the fact that habeas corpus, "the great common law writ of
liberty,"' is thought by some legal historians to have originally been used not
to get people out of prison but rather to put them in it,4 its exact origin remains
obscure and unsettled.5 Nevertheless, it is generally conceded that most of the
2 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 37, 43 (1927) (dissenting opinion Brandeis, J.).
3 Ex parte Kelly, 123 N.J. Eq. 489, 198 Atl. 203, 207 (1938); Goodman, Use and Abuse
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948).
4 Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L. Q. Rav. 64 (1902); Parker, Limiting the
Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949).
5 Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, 436 (1867), (Cooley, 5.): "The writ is so ancient
that its origin is lost in obscurity"; Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
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very early writs of habeas corpus had but a single purpose -namely, to bring
or "deliver up" a desired party before a court of law. Definite progress was
made by Parliament in defining with specificity the formalistic limits of the
writ when it passed the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679." But, exactly when
the writ ceased being but a mere command "to deliver" and instead became a
command "to deliver with cause" no one can rightly say. This transformation
is, however, taken to be the most significant step in the historical growth and
development of habeas corpus as the very bulwark of individual liberty.8
Since the United States Constitution did not grant to the federal courts
the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus, the requisite jurisdiction could
only be conferred upon the courts by Congress." With the Judiciary Act of
1789, the lower federal courts were given the necessary power to issue the writ.10
In 1867, Congress sought to effect a change in the English common law rule
by extending the protection of the writ to "all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty
7 F.R.D. 313 (1948); Note, Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis
and Comparison, 34 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 81 (1959).
It is interesting to note that as early as 48 Ed. III, traces of the writ of habeas corpus
may be found.
See Cohen, Habeas Corpus Gum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ, 18
CAN. B. Rnv. 11 (1940); Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts - Constitutional Right or
Legislative Grace? 40 CALIF. L. Rav. 335 (1952); Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus-A Protean
Writ and Remedy, 10 OHIO ST. L. J. 301 (1949); Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949); and United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), for
detailed considerations of the historical background of habeas corpus.
6 Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ, 18 CAN.
B. REv. 11 (1940); Note, Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis and
Comparison, 34 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 81 (1954).
The King's courts used this writ for several centuries as an offensive weapon in their
continuous battle to ensure permanent control of the lower courts. It is generally thought
that not until the reign of Henry VII, however, was the original underlying purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus fulfilled when it was first used against the Crown in an attempt to
restrain arbitrary imprisonments which the Crown was making in alarming numbers. 2
HALLAM, HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 310 (2d ed. 1862).
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Writ of Privilege was held to be co-extensive
with the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Thus, the clergy, members of Parliament, ministers of
the King, as well as the superior court officers, were the chief groups that availed themselves
of the writes protection. 2 COKE, INSTITUTES 3, 4, 150, 212; 4 COKE, INSTITUTES 24, 25, 363.
7 The Act codified the common law and stated that a criminal who was convicted by
a court of competent jurisdiction could not obtain a review of his conviction by using the
writ of habeas corpus because if the sentencing court had general criminal jurisdiction, this
was in itself conclusive proof of the legality of confinement. The Act went still further and
provided an absolute guarantee for the use of proper legal processes in reviewing the appli-
cation for the writ when and if so made by the petitioner. Yet, the Act did not provide for
a review of the fairness of the application. Instead, it applied only when one was imprisoned
on a criminal charge. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Jenks, The Story
of Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. Rv. 64 (1902).
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 243 (1883) noted that the
Act of 1679 was "as ill drawn as it is celebrated."
8 Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ, 18 CAN.
B. REv. 11 (1940).
9 Ex parte Bolliman, 4 U.S. 75 (1807); Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts - Con-
stitutional Right or Legislative Grace? 40 CALIF. L. Rav. 335, 347-48 (1952).
10 The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly provided: "[All the before mentioned courts
of the United States, shall have power to issue writs ... of habeas corpus . . .and all other
writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law... 
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or law of the United States."" Adequate provision was further made for inquiry
into the facts surrounding a petitioner's detention. 2 By 1915, the courts had
held that where a petitioner alleged he was convicted by virtue of an unconstitu-
tional statute or even a city ordinance, and was convicted twice for the same
offense, they would proceed to examine the complete record. If need be, they
would even look beyond the record. This would be done, however, only where
the additional evidence would not tend to contradict the record itself."3
With the case of Walker v. Johnson,4 the Court openly promoted an
uncontrolled use of writs of habeas corpus by federal prisoners. Essentially,
the decision was that when a federal court undertakes the process of determin-
ing whether to issue the writ, it must consider all allegations set out in the
petitioner's brief as true. This presumption of truth was to be made regardless
of how the allegations might "tax credulity" except to the extent that, in the
judgment of the court, they conflicted with the records before it. Not until
1948, with the passage of Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, was a concerted
effort made to curb the flagrant abuse of habeas corpus writs.'
11 14 Stat. 385; In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 23 (1890); United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 211 (1952).
As early as 1830 in the case of Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202, Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall said:
This writ is, as has been said, in the nature of a writ of error, which
brings up the body of the prisoner, with the cause of commitment. The
court can undoubtedly inquire into the sufficiency of that cause; but if
it be the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction . . . is not that
judgment in itself sufficient cause? Can the court, upon this writ, look
beyond the judgment, and re-examine the charges on which it was rendered?
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is rendered,
and pronounces the law of the case.
12 Ibid.
In 1873, the Supreme Court read into the Act of 1789 the procedural change in the
Act of 1867, and accordingly used certiorari to bring before it the record of a trial court
in-habeas corpus proceedings which involved a petitioner under sentence. Collings, supra
note 5, at 352; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
13 Collings, supra note 5, at 353.
14 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
15 See 33 F.R.D. 363, 409 (1963) for a symposium entitled, "Applications for Writs of
Habeas Corpus and Post Convictions Review of Sentences in the United States Courts";
Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.L.R.
78 (1964); Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus: How to Make Two Parallel Judicial
Lines Meet, 49 A.B.A. 1166 (1963); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Before Bringing
Federal Habeas Corpus: A Reappraisal of U.S. Code Section 2254, 43 NEa. L. REy. 120
(94). In Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 1948, Judge L. E.
dman points out the prominent problems which the Northern District of California
had with the Alcatraz penitentiary inmates abusing their right to petition for habeas corpus
before passage of Section 2255. The Judge notes that prison officials, instead of discouraging
the flow of groundless petitions, actually encouraged the prisoners to keep themselves
"occupied" by harassing the courts with countless writs of habeas corpus. The "penitentiary
racket" was justified on the grounds that by keeping the prison inmates "occupied," they
were less apt to devote themselves to more mischievous pursuits.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 296-97 (1948)
correctly assessed the area when he said:
Confinement is neither enjoyable nor profitable. And it is safe to
assume that it neither gives rise to new scruples nor magnifies old ones
which would handicap petitioner's preparation of one habeas corpus appli-
cation after another. ... The number of times the government must retry
the case depends only on the prisoner's ingenuity, industry and imagination.
... The prisoner, of course, has nothing to lose in any event. Perjury has
few terrors for a man already sentenced to 65 years' imprisonment for a
crime of violence. Even such honor as exists among thieves is not too
precious to be sacrificed for a chance at liberty. Consequently, his varying
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Section 2255 of the Judicial Code allows the federal courts to disregard
a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the motion to vacate procedure under
the section is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the validity of the petitioners
allegations can run the gamut of all those perpetuated in the pages of the
United States Reports.
Habeas Corpus Cases and Motions to Vacate Sentence [2255]
Filed in 86 United States District Courts,
Fiscal Years 1941 to 1959.**
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases
Motions
to vacate State Habeas
Fiscal Year Total Deportation Other sentences Corpus Cases
1941 ................... 598 153 318 ...... 127
1942 .................. 568 88 350 ...... 130
1943 .................. 841 99 473 ...... 269
1944 ................... 1,204 75 524 ...... 605
1945 .................... 1,083 72 475 536
1946 ................... 1,291 420 379 ...... 492
1947 .................... 1,136 258 393 .... 485
1948 ................... 1,240 191 506 543
1949 .................... 1,391 224 481 102 584
1950 .................. 1,298 217 409 112 560
1951 .... ...... 1,199 239 399 79 482
1952 .................... 1,383 346 406 90 541
1953 .................. 1,336 323 346 119 548
1954 .................. 1,555 300 395 263 597
1955 .................... 1,474 173 362 279 660
1956 .................... 1,512 114 429 235 734
1957 .................. 1,424 76 339 231 778
1958 ................... 1,559 75 408 321 755
1959 ................. 1,690 117 449 302 822
**Annual Report, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, September 1959, p. 11-34.
[A]t present, the following objections may be raised through a writ of
habeas corpus by a federal prisoner in his efforts to attack a conviction:
1. That the Court lacked jurisdiction of the offense.
2. That the Court lacked jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
3. That the statute pursuant to which the defendant was prosecuted is
unconstitutional.
4. That the indictment attempted to charge an offense unknown to or
not cognizable under any Act of Congress. This consideration is to
be distinguished from the question whether the allegations of the
indictment are sufficient.
5. In the event a defendant was prosecuted by information, that he was
entitled to prosecution by indictment.
6. If defendant was tried without a jury, that he was entitled to a trial
by jury and had not waived that right.
7. That he was not accorded the right of counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment and had not waived that right. Included in this objection may
be an assertion that the defendant had not been apprised of his rights
and was not aware that the court would appoint counsel for him if
he was indigent and unable to retain counsel.
8., That he had been induced to plead guilty either by misrepresentation,
or by threats or coercion exercised either by the prosecuting attorney,
or by the arresting officers.
9. That he was mentally incompetent, either by reason of insanity or by
virtue of the fact that he was under the influence of drugs, when he
pleaded guilty or during the trial.
10. That he had been convicted on the basis of perjured evidence. There
seems to be some difference of opinion by the authorities on the ques-
tion whether this objection is available only if the prosecuting authori-
ties were aware of the perjury but nevertheless deliberately introduced
the false testimony.
11. That the trial court was under the domination of a mob or influenced
by the threat of imminent mob violence, with the result that the
trial was but a sham and a mockery.
12. That generally the proceedings at the trial were so grossly lacking in
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confinement." Since most petitions for habeas corpus are brought before the
motion to vacate or set aside is ever heard, they are summarily dismissed and
the prisoner is directed to first seek relief by motion."7 Many of the courts, in
elements of fairness and justice as to result in depriving the defendant
of due process of law.
Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26, 49 (1945).
Conversely, the following objections may not be made under habeas corpus, simply
because they do not affect jurisdiction:
1. That the indictment is defective or insufficient or that the court
erred in construing it, once it is perceived that the indictment attempts
to charge an offense cognizable under an act of Congress and of which
the trial court had jurisdiction.
2. That evidence was introduced at the trial in violation of the provision
of the Fourth Amendment proscribing unreasonable searches and
seizures or in contravention of the privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
3. That the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.
4. That the court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal.
5. That the court made erroneous rulings in respect to the admission or
exclusion of evidence in the course of the trial.
6. That the court committed error in its charge to the jury.
Holtzoff, supra at 50. See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHio ST. L.J. 337
(1949).
16 28 U.S.C. § 2255, supra note 1; Osborne v. Looney, 221 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1955).
17 Myers v. Welch, 179 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1950); Cline v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 822 (5th
Cir. 1949); McGough v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1949).
Since Section 2255 was enacted, only three reported decisions have been made in
which habeas corpus petitions were granted to federal prisoners authorized as such to use
the motion. Mugavero v. Swope, 86 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (granted before the
motion was tried); Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931 (D. Cal. 1949) (same); St. Clair
v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1949) (granted after motion denied). See Note, Section
2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas Corpus, 59 YALE L.J. 1183
(1950).
In 1948, when the Section was first enacted, the district courts received 803 applica-
tions for the writ of habeas corpus by federal prisoners. Dir. of Adm. Off. U.S. Courts Ann. Rep.
132-3 (1948). In 1961, 806 federal prisoners filed 860 petitions for habeas corpus (other
than in deportation cases) in addition, that is, to 560 motions to vacate. Dir. of Adm. Off.
US. Courts Ann. Rep. 165 (1961).
The following statistics were obtained from Mr. Ronald H. Beattie, Chief of the Division
of Procedural Studies and Statistics. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and
from Mr. William B. Luck,. attorney in the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in letters dated September 5, 1963, and
November 19, 1964, respectively. These figures are for the judicial districts of those states
in which federal penitentiaries are located and for the fiscal years running from July 1 to
June 30. Deportation figures have been excluded and the number of motions to vacate
made are in parentheses, with the number of petitions for habeas corpus standing without
parentheses and representing those habeas corpus cases in which the United States was a
defendant.
FISCAL YEAR 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
California (N.) 31(8) 19(17) 40(18) 18(11) 14(15) 7(37)
Georgia (N.) 34(4) 48(2) 65(14) 46(7) 75(3) 73(11)
Illinois (N.) 3(7) 2(5) 2(5) 10(18) 6(9) 5(19)
Illinois (E.) 0 0 1(2) 4(4) 0(4) 5(7)
Illinois (S.) 0(1) 0 0(3) 0(7) 1(3) 0(8)
Indiana (S.) 8 28(2) 35(6) 11(5), 12(6) 38(15)
Kansas 147(4) 217(12) 158(10) 96(17) 105(17) 58(26)
Michigan (E.) 8 4 17 .11(3) 10(2) 11(31)
Michigan (W.) 0 2 0 0(1) 0(3) 0(8)
Ohio (N.) 0(10) 0(8) 1(3) 1(4) 0(3) 1(16)
Ohio (S.) 2 2(2) 5(6) 0 0(7) 1(11)
Pennsylvania (M.) 6 25 19(3) it 17(5) 39(2)
Washington (W.) 22(14) 29(16) 61(11) 26 24(9) 29(11)
The current or majority view, as set forth in Rubenstein v. United States, 227 F.2d
-638 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1956), and United States ex rel. Lequillou
v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1954), is that Section 2255 is a substitute for the writ of
habeas corpus and normally supersedes it. Thus, this section, so some authorities hold, is the
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fact, are exercising wide judicial discretion in deciding whether to issue a writ
of habeas corpus by giving controlling weight to a prior refusal to grant the
writ even though res adjudicata is not a ground for refusing habeas corpus1
All things considered, a prisoner would stand a far better chance of obtain-
ing the desired relief from the courts if he pursued the writ of habeas corpus
alone, rather than being encumbered with the motion under Section 2255. This
is so primarily because the courts, being required to issue the writ "forthwith"
and the hearings being commenced within five days, are enabled to far surpass
the long, drawn-out and, at times, arduous requirements of the motion to vacate
procedure and thus render justice in a speedy and efficient manner.'
exclusive remedy for federal prisoners where the issues controverted are those which normally
have been within the reach of habeas corpus. It would appear, then, that Section 2255 is
not normally the one exclusive remedy but is always the exclusive remedy for federal prisoners
who claim the right to be released because of a jurisdictional or constitutional trial defect.
See Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas Corpus,
59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950); Note, Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical
Analysis and Comparison, 34 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 81, 91 (1959); Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HI-v. L. Rxv. 441 (1963).
18 Garrison v. Johnston, 151 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1945); United States ex rel. Bergdoll
v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897, 129 A.L.R. 1165, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1939); Wong Doo
v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
In Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510, 514-15 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
897 (1950), however, the Court held that it did not have unlimited discretion to refuse to
entertain a second motion to vacate under Section 2255. Instead, it stated that the motion
to vacate should be so disposed of ". . . in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, guided
and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of
the relief sought. . . ." Yet, "if the second or successive motion sets up new or dissimilar
grounds for relief which are within the purview of the grounds enumerated in the third
paragraph of 2255, and the motion and the records and files in the case do not conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court will ordinarily entertain such second
or successive motion." Generally, this rule is followed. Annot., 20 A.L.R. 2d 976, 996 (1951).
So, while it has been declared that res adjudicata is pertinent to Section 2255 proceed-
ings, the reasons for dismissing a second or successive motion have generally been the same
as those justifying a dismissal of successive habeas corpus applications. Lipscomb v. United
States, 226 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956). Note, Procedural
Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis and Comparison, 34 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
81, 90 (1959).
It would thus appear that, if a second motion is based upon the same legal and factual
grounds as the first, a court is entirely free to dismiss it. Ray v. United States, 295 F.2d
416 (10th Cir. 1961), per curiam, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 875 (1962); in Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the high court reiterated its position in this area by declaring
that a judge was only permitted- not compelled in any way whatsoever -to decline to
entertain successive applications on which hearings could properly be denied on the basis
that the grounds asserted were previously heard. The judge was only to act as such if he
were satisfied that justice would not be met by reconsidering the merits.
Some courts even have held that the judicial discretion to dismiss extends to any suc-
cessive motion regardless of whether it presents new grounds, either factual, legal, or both,
since the prisoner is seeking the same relief-namely, vacation of his sentence. Note, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 788, 802 (1963). But, where a second motion presents new grounds, yet is
not entertained, the question then arises whether the remedy is "inadequate or ineffective."
Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 VILL. L. Rv. 293, 358 (1957).
19 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1952); Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases, 2 ViLL. L.
Rnv. 293 (1957).
It is well to remember that 28 U.S.C. § 2255, passed in 1948, unequivocally states
that a writ of habeas corpus will not issue unless an applicant shall have first of all exhausted
all the remedies available to him under the law of his state.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit speaking in Potter v. Dowd, 146
F.2d 244 (1944) held that the writ of habeas corpus should be granted even though the
petitioner only applied for coram nobis but once in Indiana. By this split decision, the court
apparently reversed its prior stand requiring exhaustion of state habeas corpus procedure.
Note, Procedural Due Process in Criminal Cases, 47 Mici. L. Rnv. 71, 79 (1948); Marino
v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563-64 (1947), is in accord on basic principles.
In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963), Chief Justice Warren held that:
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Coram Nobis
The common law writ of error coram nobis issued from the Chancery
-Court to the Court of the King's Bench after judgment in that court, ordering
the judges then assembled to examine the official record for error of fact."0
Since the remedy naturally tended to threaten, if not indeed loosen, the absolute
finality of the Court's decision, the writ developed quite slowly.2
While the federal courts recognized at an early date the propriety and
"Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court on habeas corpus must
hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full
and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial
or in a collateral proceeding. In other words, a federal evidentiary hearing
is required unless the state court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably
found the relevant facts." Going on to particularize the situation, Justice
Warren noted: ". . . [W]e hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1)
the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as
a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allega-
tion of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it
appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant
a full and fair fact hearing."
See, the September 1963 Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus presented by
Judge Orie L. Phillips of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to the Judicial Conference
of the United States regarding proposed revisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
20 STEPHEN, PLEADING, § 99, (Andrew's ed. 1894); Note, The Writ of Error Coram
Nobis, 37 HARv. L. REv. 744 (1924).
21 Note, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 37 HA.xv. L. Rav. 744 (1924). The correc-
tion of mere clerical errors, coveture, death, and the appearance of an infant or an insane
person without an attorney or guardian, were the common historical grounds for the issuance
of coram nobis. This writ was available not only in civil cases, but in criminal cases as
well, and could be brought any time after judgment. King v. Jones, 2 Ld. Raym. 1525, 92
K.B. 489 (1727); Meggot v. Broughton, Cro. Eliz. 106, 78 K.B. 364 (1588); Dawkes v.
Payton, Sty. 216, 218, 82 K.B. 657 (1650).
See Briggs, Coram N-obis-Is It Either an Available or the Most Satisfactory Post-
Conviction Remedy to Test Constitutionality in Criminal Proceedings? 17 MONT. L. REV.
160, 186 (1956); Harvey, 28 U.S.C. 2255: From Habeas Corpus to Coram Nobis, 1 WASH-
BURN L.J. 381 (1961).
At common law, the writs of error coram nobis were severely limited in scope and
were allowed to bring to the attention of the court errors of fact affecting the validity and
regularity of the proceedings, but which were not in issue at the trial, and which if known
at the time, would have prevented the judgment. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL 501 (1947).
Modernly, the writ of error coram nobis may be thought of as a writ applied for at
subsequent terms of the same court and before the same judge who gave the original judg-
ment. The writ in substance, then, petitions the court to revoke the judgment for errors
of fact not apparent on the record not negligently withheld from the court by the applicant.
Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L. REv. 423 (1934).
See Bernardin, Writs of Error in Criminal Cases, 47 MASS. L.Q. 37 (1962); Orfield,
The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L. REv. 423 (1934); Orfield,
Early Federal Criminal Procedure, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 503 (1961); Note, Writ of Error
Coram Nobis Allowed in Federal Court to Attack State Prisoner's Prior Federal Conviction,
53 COLUm. L. REV. 737 (1953); Note, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 37 HtAv. L. REv.
744 (1924); Note, Federal Courts-Common Law Coram Nobis Not Superseded by Enact-
ment of New Motion Procedure for Vacating Convictions, 66 HARv. L. Rlv. 1137 (1953);
Note, The Need for Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950); and
Note, Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis in Indiana, 26 IND. L.J. 528 (1951) for further
general discussion of the writ of error corarn nobis at the state and federal level.
In the federal courts, coram nobis has been used- as has habeas corpus -primarily
to attack convictions in violation of either jurisdictional or constitutional guarantees. Note,
Federal Courts - Common Law Coram Nobis Not Superseded by Enactment of New Motion
Procedure for Vacating Convictions, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1953).
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usefulness of coram nobis in civil cases, subsequent recognition of the writ's
value in criminal cases was delayed.22
Due to the Revisor's note to Section 2255 of the Judicial Code which
stated that the section "restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the
nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis,"'2 it was commonly thought
that Section 2255 was in fact a substitute for the ancient writ of error coram
nobis.24 But, in the 1954 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Morgan,25
it was held that Section 2255 did not in fact preclude use of the writ of coram
nobis in the federal courts.26
To reiterate, Section 2255 was passed not with the idea of enlarging the
class of remedies already available to attack a conviction, but rather to provide
that a proper attack upon an original conviction be made in the sentencing
22 Phillip v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, 678 (1886); New England Furniture & Carpet Co.
v. Willcuts, 55 F.2d 983 (D.C. Minn. 1931).
The first case holding that coram nobis was available in criminal cases was United
States v. Stese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944). Six Circuits had either actually ruled or
strongly indicated, by 1948, that criminal defendants could effectively avail themselves of
the writ of common law coram nobis. Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1947);
Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946); Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d
106 (5th Cir. 1946); United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944); Tinkoff v. United
States, 129 F.2d 21, 23 (7th Cir. 1942); Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998, 1000 (9th
Cir. 1941). Note, Writ of Error Coram Nobis Allowed in Federdl Court to Attack State
Prisoner's Prior Federal Conviction, 53 COLUM. L. Rlv. 737 (1953).
It would seem that the willingness of the courts to recognize the writ of error coram nobis
in the criminal process was in large response to several Supreme Court decisions that greatly
enlarged the grounds on which an imprisoned defendant could attack the constitutional
basis of his detention. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23 See supra note 1.
24 United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1953); United States v. Morris,
83 F. Supp. 970, 971 (D.D.C. 1949) ; United States v. Cap, 83 F. Supn. 152 (D. Md. 1949) ;
Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas Corpus, 59
YALa L.J. 1183 (1950); Note, Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis
and Comparison, 34 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 81, 92 (1959).
25 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
26 Note, Federal Courts- Common Law Coram Nobis Not Superseded by Enactment
of New Motion Procedure for Vacating Convictions, 66 HAIv. L. Rev. 1137 (1953).
One of the most important results of the Morgan case, supra note 25, is that even
after a prisoner completes his term of confinement, he may still have the means of obtaining
judicial relief from an invalid conviction. Accord, United States v. Roth, 283 F.2d 765
(2nd Cir. 1960).
The current Indiana position on the writ of error coram nobis is most interesting. The
Supreme Court of the State held, in Barker v. State, 191 N.E. 2d 9 (Ind. 1963), that the equi-
table doctrine of "laches" would prevent the writ from issuing. The court went on to note that
only one petition for error coram nobis could be presented to a court. Burns Ind. Ann. Stat. §
9-3302; Etheridge v. State, 240 Ind. 384, 164 N.E. 2d 642 (1960); 17 I.L.E. Judgments, §
380, (Bums 1956 Rep.).
While Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 186 N.E. 293 (1933), pointed out the rule that in
cniminal cases the writ of error coram nobis will not lie where there are other adequate remedies
such as motion to vacate judgment, new trial, or appeal available to the petitioner, and the
subsequent case of Caram v. State, 208 Ind. 297, 196 N.E. 78 (1935), went on to hold
that the trial court had absolute discretion to hold a hearing to rule on the merits of issuing
the writ without calling the prisoner forth, Rule 2-40 of the Indiana Supreme Court would
drastically change the whole picture in this area. The first paragraph of the new rule states:
"Hereafter, no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any action for a writ of error coram
nobis in any criminal case, but the remedy heretofore granted in such a proceeding shall
hereafter be obtained solely through a motion for a new trial in the case out of which the
cause therefore is alleged to have originated. Each ground shall be separately specified in
the motion for a new trial and any ground or error not so specified shall be considered
waived .... " Rs GEsTAE 7, 8 (Sept. 1963).
See Note, Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis in Indiana, 26 IND. L. J. 529 (1951).
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court and not in some other court through use of the writ of habeas corpus. 27
Resort to habeas corpus is thus allowed only when the remedy by motion is
"inadequate or ineffective." 2
While the form of the attack is direct, the grounds for initiating the action
to vacate or set aside are limited to matters which may only be raised by a col-
lateral attack. 9 Hence, the central design of the section - to relieve the federal
district courts where federal prisons are located of the heavy burden of passing
on unrestricted habeas corpus applications - is sought to be effectuated."0
II. SECTION 2255: EFFECTIVE OR INEFFECTrVE AM TO A FEDERAL PRISONER?
When relief is denied under the motion to vacate or set aside, this does
not necessarily imply that the motion itself is inadequate or ineffective. In
Jones v. Squier,s' both the motion to vacate and the petition for writ of habeas
corpus had been passed on and subsequently denied. On appeal from the denial
of the writ, the court held that it was not conclusively shown that the motion
provided by Section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
the prisoner's detention. The court further noted that at the time of the Con-
stitution's adoption, the writ was limited to examination of the face of the record
solely for determining proper jurisdiction. Just as Congress had later proceeded
to enact remedies "in addition" to those previously available and thereby to
expand the writ, so Congress could later restrict the use of the writ by Section
2255 without violating a prisoner's constitutional rights.3 2 With the case of
27 See Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas
Corpus, 59 YALE L. J. 1183 (1950); Note, Federal Courts-Common Law Coram Nobis Not
Superseded by Enactment of New Motion Procedure for Vacating Convictions, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 1137 (1953).
28 Birtch v. United States, 173 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 944 (1949); United States v. Myers, 84 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 181
F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
29 Kreuter v. United States, 201 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1953).
The motion embodied in § 2255 is used, then, not to review the proceedings of
the trial as would be done upon appeal or writ of error. Instead, it is used only to test
their validity when judged upon the face of the record or by principles of constitutional law.
Hurst v. United States, 177 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1949); Kinney v. United States, 177 F.2d
895 (10th Cir. 1949).
30 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Orfield, New Trial in Federal
Criminal Cases, 2 VILL. L. REv. 293, 357 (1957); See supra note 1.
Even though § 2255 was not intended to restrict the prisoner's right of collateral
attack, the following changes, to recapitulate, have nonetheless resulted:
1. The petitioner must now make his motion to the sentencing court rather than apply-
ing to the district court of confinement.
2. Petitioner's presence is no longer required at the hearing.
3. Res adjudicata is now apparently applicable to successive motions.
4. Petitioner is assured of a "prompt" hearing rather than having' a definite time
guarantee placed on the hearing.
5. Petitioner's right to proceed by habeas corpus is abolished under the section unless
the motion encompassed thereunder is "inadequate or ineffective."
Note, Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis and Comparison,
34 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 81, 88 (1959).
In Pelly v. United States, 214 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1954), the purpose of Section 2255
was listed as merely a means of giving a prisoner a proper method for a direct attack on his
sentence in the court where he was tried and sentenced. A motion to vacate sentence is, after
all, but an independent civil action. Schiebelhut v. United States, 318 F.2d 785 (6th Cir.
1963).
31 195 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1952).
32 Ibid, 181. Cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330 (1915); Ex parte Watkins, 3
Pet. 193, 202, 209 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
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Close v.' United States,3" the court stated that it was no more unreasonable for
Congress to require exhaustion of remedies by the Section 2255 motion before
resort to habeas corpus than it was to require a petitioner to exhaust his state
remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus. The word "exhaust" is a most
unfortunate one- particularly since Section 2255 does not speak of an exhaus-
tion of remedies. The court's main function is but to determine whether the
remedy is "inadequate or ineffective," with the problem of remedy exhaustion,
as such, being relatively unimportant."
In United States v. Bradford," and in United States v. Lavelle," it was
stated that after a federal prison sentence is completed by the moving party,
the federal courts have no power and jurisdiction to vacate the sentence. This
is so merely because the party, once he completes his sentence, is no longer "in
custody" of the federal authorities." The Court, speaking in Pollard v. United
States,"5 however, held that a proceeding brought under Section 2255 was not
rendered moot by the expiration of the term of the sentence. The fact that the
petitioner was, at the time of the hearing, unconditionally at large had no bear-
33 198 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952).
34 Clark v. Markley, 186 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Ind. 1960), aff'd, 273 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.
1958); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949).
Since habeas corpus is not a "writ of course" but rather a "writ of right" when reason-
able cause is shown for its issuance, one district court has held that it is not in violation of
the Constitution to limit the right of the sentencing court unless the remedy there proves
inadequate or ineffective. Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 .(10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 897 (1950).
The Constitutional validity of § 2255 has been generally upheld by the courts.
United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1953); Close v. United States, 198 F.2d
144 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952); Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510
(10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th
Cir. -1949). But, in Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1951), the Ninth
Circuit held that the section was, in light of its application by the District Court in the instant
case, a nullity because it prevented the imprisoned petitioner from effectively using habeas
corpus and having the opportunity to be heard.
On appeal, Mr. Justice Vinson, speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court, avoided
passing directly on the constitutionality of the section by holding that the section itself did
not impinge upon the prisoner's right to attack his conviction by habeas corpus. Since,
therefore, the provisions in the section adequately provided the petitioner with a hearing,
there was no need to, consider the issue of constitutionality. The Court of Appeals decision
was vacated and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. United
States v. Hayman 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
Although jurisdiction is withheld from other courts by the § 2255 provisions, this
does not violate article 1, § 9 of the federal constitution which specifically regulates
the suspension of habeas corpus. This point was illustrated in United States v. Anselmi,
supra. Here, a moving party appealed his denial of a § 2255 motion and contended
that the Section was an unlawful suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The court answered
that since there was an adequate and effective remedy in the court of sentence by way of
a full right of appeal, the right to use habeas corpus was not in effect suspended.
35 194 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1952).
36 194 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1952).
37 United States v. Forlano, 319 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963), held that application for
writ of error coram nobis was the proper manner of attacking the constitutionality of a
conviction where the sentence had been completely served.
Even though it is specifically stated in § 2255 that the motion to vacate "may be
made at any time," no hard and fast rules have been formulated in determining whether
to entertain or refuse a motion on the basis of its application within appropriate time limits.
The courts have weighed the merits of each pending case in deciding if the motion is timely.
See United States v. Ray, 183 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1960), where eighteen years was too
long a period to have waited; United States v. Witherspoon, 167 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1958),
where a delay of eight years was fatal; and Keto v. United States, 189 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.
1951), where only three and one-half years was held too late.
.38 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
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ing on the granting of a motion pursuant to the section. Nevertheless, it was
held in Heflin v. United States9 that the "in custody" requirement of Section
2255 was comparable to that of habeas corpus. As such, a petitioner serving
the first of three consecutive sentences was without standing to raise the question
of the legality of the third sentence which he had not yet begun to serve. It
was not until 1960, and the case of Parker v. Ellis,"0 that the rule laid down in
the Pollard case was conclusively held to be inapplicable to Section 2255 pro-
ceedings. Relief under the section was unavailable to any party not in custody."
If the petitioner's motion to vacate, as well as the records and the files of
his case, conclusively show that he is not entitled to relief, a hearing to rule on
the motion is unnecessary.42 The cases on this point have, for the most part,
followed the clear statutory directive of the section in not according a petitioner
the right to a hearing when his motion is clearly without merit. 3 In fact, in
Risken v. United States," the court stated that no hearing on a motion to vacate
was required when the only question raised was one of law. But, in United
States v. Diggs," Guy v. United States, 6 and Porter v. United States,"7 because
of the seriousness of the situation in each case, the courts involved felt that
exception to the above rule was warranted and a hearing was ordered.4
39 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
40 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
41 The prisoner must be in federal and not state custody. Ragavage v. United States,
272 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 806 (1960); Sansbury v. Peppersack,
179 F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Md. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1960). But if he is released
from custody-United States v. Brilliant, 274 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 806 (1960), petition for rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 857 (1960) -or pardoned-
Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U.S. 792 (1943) -the court is without jurisdiction to entertain
the motion. One on parole, however, is still considered in custody. Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236 (1963).
Since only the court which imposed the sentence has jurisdiction to hear the motion
provided for under § 2255, there is no discretionary power to transfer the place of
hearing. It must be the place of trial even though the possibility of prisoner "joy rides"
from penitentiary to court still persist. Baker v. United States, 287 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1961).
Hence, in Martin v. United States, 248 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1957), where the defendant
was paroled from a Florida court - the very same court which later suspended his parole
-he was refused the right to make a motion to vacate in a Minnesota court. The result
could well follow that where a moving party is convicted and confined under the jurisdiction
of the same court, which tried and sentenced him, this court, then, would be the proper
court for the motion as well as for the petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Marchese v.
United States, 304 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1962), appeal pending.
42 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See supra note 1, para. 3.
43 United States v. Fleenor, 177 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1949); People v. Seidenberg, 221
N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1961); Pasley v. Overholser, 282 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Simmons v.
United States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962); Thomas v. United States, 290 F.2d 696 (9th
Cir. 1961); Swepston v. United States, 289 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1961); Davis v. United
States, 311 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1963).
44 197 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1952).
45 304 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1962).
46 287 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1961).
47 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962).
48 In Diggs, the court held that the petition for correction of the lower court sentence
was to be remanded to the District Court. This was decreed because the question of whether
the plea of guilty was accepted in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was not properly before the Court of Appeals and the basic contention itself was
not of a frivolous nature.
The court, speaking in Guy, held that petitioner's motion for vacation of sentence raised
questions of fact only determinable by hearing in open court at which time petitioner could
then be heard.
A hearing was ordered in Porter because the court felt that the defendant's attorney
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Relief under Section 2255 may generally be sought on the same grounds
required for relief by writ of habeas corpus."9 Those grounds relied on most
frequently for motions entertained under the Section have been stated as being:
unjust deprivation of constitutional rights- especially right to counsel,"0 errors
in the conduct of the trial,"' and insufficiency of evidence to convict.52
was in a duplicitous position owing to his commitments to other parties in defendant's trial.
A moving party's presence will be ordered only where the court feels that it will be
helpful in attempting to deduce the truth of the matter involved. McDonald v. United States,
282 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1960); Close v. United States, 198 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1952);
Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1949). Mr. Chief Justice Vinson set the
guidelines which most of the courts follow in this particular area when he said:
The existence of power to produce the prisoner does not, of course, mean
that he should be automatically produced in every Section 2255 proceeding.
. . . Whether the prisoner should be produced depends upon the issues
raised by the particular case. Where, as -here, there are substantial issues
of fact as to events in which the prisoner participated, the trial court
should require his production for a hearing.
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1952). Accord, Machibroda v. United
States 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
Chief Judge William Steckler of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana noted in a personal interview, October 2, 1963, that almost all motions
to vacate, in his court, were disposed of by rulings made without a hearing in open court.
The reasons for refusal of motions, when such are made, are set out in a complete memo-
randum and signed by the Judge. The Judge further noted that that particular procedure
had been most effective.
Quite a number of jurisdictions have held that a denial of a motion to vacate, made only
upon the record without notice of hearing to the petitioner, is improper and error on the
court's part. Thomas v. United States, 217 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1954); Slack v. United States,
196 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Pisciatta, 199 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1952);
Howard v. United States, 186 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1951); United States v. Von Wilier, 181
F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1950). Nonetheless, it appears that the need for notice, like that of a
hearing on the motion itself, will turn largely on the court's determination of the validity and
merit of the moving party's claim for relief as gleaned from the motion, the records, and the
files. Bowman, Processing a Motion Attacking Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial
Code, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 788, 802 (1963). This is true, even though the Supreme Court, in
Hayman, said, "Respondent, denied an opportunity to be heard, has lost something indispens-
able, however convincing the ex parte showing." 342 U.S. 221 (1952); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934); U.S. v. Myers, 84 F. Supp. 766, 767 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 181
F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 (1950).
49 United States v. Myers, 84 F.Supp. 766, 767 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 (1950). See supra note 1; Note, Procedural
Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis and Comparison, 34 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
87, 88 (1959); Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas
Corpus, 59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950).
50 Annot., 20 A.L.R. 2d 982 (1951).
51 Ibid.
52 Lipscomb v. United States, 298 F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1962); Link v. United States, 295
F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1961); 'Curry v. United States, 292 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1961); Shobe
v. United States, 220 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1955).
Though by no means an exhaustive consideration, the following grounds are those which
are frequently raised, and at the same time most frequently refused, by the courts in passing
on the merits of motions to vacate under Section 2255:
(1) That defendant, at the time of the crime, was insane or mentally incompetent.
Clayton v. United States, 302 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1962); Breaton v. United States, 303 F.2d
557 (8th Cir. 1962); Brown v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Oregon 1960); Bur-
dette v. Settle, 296 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Carter v. United States, 283 F.2d 200 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). See also, United States v. Hill, 319 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1963), and Sturrup v.
United States, 218 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.N.C. 1963), where the court held that bald assertions
of insanity - unsubstantiated by records - would carry no hearing merit.
In Anderson v. United States, 318 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1963), and Fisher v. United
States, 317 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1963), the courts held, in essence, that a prisoner was entitled
to a hearing on a motion to vacate sentence on the ground he was mentally incompetent at
the time of his arraignment when the trial motion was accompanied by necessary papers
showing a history of mental illness.
The early cases have generally held that a defendant's incompetency was only a defense
and did not make the conviction a nullity. Hahn v. United States, 178 F.2d 11 (10th Cir.
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The Right to Counsel
In McCartney v. United States,3 the Seventh Circuit enunciated the
majority rule regarding a petitioner's right to counsel when moving to vacate
sentence under Section 2255. The court held that the rule ensuring a petitioner's
1949). Later, the courts took the view that such incompetency could make the complete trial
void and thus, the defendant would have his remedy under Section 2255. Arnold v. United
States, 271 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1959); Brown v. United States, 267 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1959);
and Smith v. United States, 267 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1959). Yet, the present view seems to
be that in light of Section 4244 of the Criminal Code - 63 STAT. 686, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1949)
- the courts have reverted to their earlier position that a § 2255 motion would not lie under
such circumstances; this applies even to cases where the issue of the defendant's competency
was not raised at trial.
(2) That contrary to the defendant's instructions, his counsel neglected to appeal from
the judgment of conviction. Glauser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961); Link
v. United States, 295 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1961); Dennis v. United States, 177 F.2d 195
(4th Cir. 1949).
(3) That the publicity preceding and during the trial was of a prejudicial nature. United
States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2nd Cir. 1952).
(4) That perjured testimony was knowingly used by the government - unless, that is,
this allegation is supported by particulars showing the alleged perjury in detail,, and the
sources of the government's alleged knowledge. Perry v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 691
(W.D. Ark. 1962); Brain v. United States, 302 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1962); Elliott v. United
States, 268 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1959); Myers v. United States, 181 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir.
1950). But, where the conduct complained of took place outside the court room, the courts
have reached a contrary conclusion on the basis that this is not a question where "the file
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Machibroda
v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
(5) That the prosecutor used intemperate language in presenting his case to the jury.
Adams v. United States, 222 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
(6) That a motion which was properly made for a judgment of acquittal was errone-
ously denied by the court. Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961).
(7) That the defendant, although he pleaded guilty at trial, was in fact not guilty.
United States v. Romane, 210 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Harris v. United States, 288
F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1961).
(8) That while the defendant had counsel at trial, he entered his plea of guilty under
a misapprehension. Dillon v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 948 (D. Ore. 1963); Downey v.
United States, 218 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Va. 1963).
(9) That the indictment was insufficient and/or defective. Fiano v. United States, 291
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1961); Keto v. United States, 189 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1951).
The basic question is not whether the indictment is vulnerable to attack by motion, but
whether it is so fatally defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Pulliam v. United
States, 178 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1949). In Pulliam the court said: "It is only where the
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, the sentence was not authorized by law, or there
was such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack that a motion to vacate will be under such section."
Id. at 778.
The sentence has been declared illegal where the information stated no federal offense
against the defendant. Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1949).
In United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1963), it was held that an indigent
could not obtain a free transcript of trial merely for his examination in order to determine
whether he wished to engage in litigation. But the District Court may and should furnish
an indigent with a transcript for purposes of instituting a collateral attack on a criminal pro-
ceeding when - and only when - the moving party has accordingly stated a proper ground
for relief and a transcript is indispensable.
(10) That defendant was entrapped into committing the offense. United States v. Daniels,
191 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Frazee v. United States, 233 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1956).
(11) That defendant's innocence may be conclusively shown by newly discovered evidence.
United States ex rel. House v. Swope, 219 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1955).
(12) That a confession resulting from an illegal detention would not be considered by the
court of appeals. Lampe v. United States, 288 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Smith v. United
States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
(13) That defendant was illegally arrested. United States v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413
(7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986 (1950).
(14) That evidence introduced at trial was obtained as a result of an unlawful search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1963); Thomas v. United States, 308 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1962); Alexander v.
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right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions, laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst,"
was not applicable to parties seeking to have their sentences vacated and set
aside in civil proceedings under the section. Since proceedings under Section
2255 are not part of the original criminal action, but merely independent col-
lateral inquiries into the validity of the conviction, a request for counsel in such
proceedings is addressed to the sound discretion of the court."s
When one considers that right to counsel problems arise only in cases of
indigent prisoners, the rigid pronouncement of the majority rule seems most
unfair. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Supp. 11, 1962) tempers the harshness of the rule,
however, and allows the indigent party to petition the court for counsel under
the in forma pauperis statute. Yet, if a judge finds that no substantial question
is presented for review and/or that the motion is of a frivolous nature, he will
deny the appeal in forma paupers.5"
An attempt to curb this unlimited- yet for the most part conscientiously
exercised- discretion of the court to reject a plea to move an appeal in forma
pauperis, was made by the Supreme Court in Coppedge v. United States.5"
If from the face of the papers he has filed, it is apparent that
the applicant will present issues for review not clearly frivolous, the
Court of Appeals should then grant leave to appeal . . . appoint
counsel to represent the appellant and proceed to a consideration of
the appeal on its merit.... If, on the other hand, the claims made
or the issues sought to be raised by the applicant are such that
their substance cannot adequately be ascertained from the face of
the defendant's application, the Court of Appeals must provide
the would-be applicant both with the assistance of counsel and a
record of sufficient completeness to enable him to attempt to make
United States, 290 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1961); Kinney v. United States. 177 F.2d 895. (10th
Cir. 1949). Contra, United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1963). See Orfield,
Searches and Seizures in Federal Criminal Cases, 24 LA. L. REv. 665, 710 (1964).(15) That the court erred in its instructions to the jury. Domenica v. United States, 292
F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961); Hastings v. United States, 184 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1954).(16) That the court erred in its rulings on the admissibility of evidence at the trial.
Curry v. United States, 292 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1961).
53 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1963).
54 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Accord, Grosjean v. American Express Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
55 United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 1953); Richardson v. United
States, 199 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Crow v. United States. 175 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1949);
Note, Right to Counsel In Federal Collateral Attack Proceedings: Section 2255, 30 U. Cm.
L. Rnv. 583 (1963).
Yet, other case authorities contend that the right to counsel under Section 2255 is merely
contingent upon the nature of the issues raised by the motion. Dillon v. United States, 307
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d
Cir. 1960).
Denial of effective assistance of counsel occurs only when performance by counsel is
so incompetent that the trial becomes a farce or a mockery of justice. Riveria v. United States,
318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963); Moia v. United States, 317 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Forlano, 319 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963).
56 Paisell v. United States, 218 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1955).
The courts in Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963), Thomas v.
United States, 308 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1962), Pasley v. Overholser, 282 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.
1960), and Watson v. Devlin, 167 F. Supp. 638 (D.C. Mich. 1957), seemed to hold, in
essence, that motions for leave to proceed under this section would be denied when it would
be an obvious miscarriage of justice to burden proposed defendants with the cost of retain-
ing counsel themselves and proceeding to defend a meritless, frivolous action not grounded
on any causes which would allow sentence to be vacated according to § 2255.
57 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
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a showing that the District Courtes certificate of lack of "good
faith" is in error and that leave to proceed with the appeal . . .
should be allowed.""
If the Coppedge case were expanded and applied to Section 2255 proceedings,
not only would the petitioner have the guaranteed opportunity to advance a
valid claim for relief, but the court would in turn have stronger standards to
guide it in ascertaining the merits of such a motion.5 9
The basic underlying problem in this area seems to be whether the courts
should pursue, in an expedient manner, the administration of justice, or whether
they should overburden themselves with the countless and petty attempts by
recalcitrant prisoners to gain their freedom. Section 2255 collateral motions,
however, are just as important as the guarantees of fair trial which are expressly
provided by the Constitution. It would behoove the federal courts to recognize
this fact and accord the party under Section 2255 every possible consideration
in his valid attempts to gain the assistance of counsel and plead in forma
pauperis.
Recently, in Gideon v. Wainwright," the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution required the states to follow the
federal rule, as set out in the Sixth Amendment, and thereby to appoint counsel
for defendants unable to employ legal assistance in their criminal prosecutions.61
This procedure was to be followed unless the right was completely, as well as
intelligently, waived by the defendant himself. Gideon was charged in a Florida
court with breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a mis-
demeanor. The court of original jurisdiction refused to appoint counsel to
represent the defendant in the action because the laws of Florida only allowed
this where a defendant was charged with a capital offense. The Supreme Court
likened this case to the famous Betts v. Brady62 and stated that the doctrine
evolving from Betts should be overruled in favor of the liberal guarantee of
counsel as a fundamental right.63 Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion,
hastened to add that whether the rule of law so embodied in the instant case
regarding noncapital cases was to apply in all criminal cases, was not to be
decided at that time.6"
It would appear from Campbell v. United States,5 as well as from Milani
v. United States,6 that the Seventh Circuit has taken an about-face from its
earlier very definite pronouncement that the need for counsel by a party under
Section 2255 proceedings was to be determined in the court's exercise of judicial
discretion.6" In fact, Campbell expressly overrules McCartney v. United Statees
in holding that a petitioner who seeks to have his sentence and judgment of
58 Id. at 446.
59 Note, Right to Counsel in Federal Collateral Attack Proceedings: Section 2255, 30 U.
6Hi. L. REv. 583 (1963).
60 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
61 Ibid.
62 316 U.S. 445 (1942).
63 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
64 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963). Accord, Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
65 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1963).
66 319 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1963).
67 McCartney v. United States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1963).
68 Ibid.
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conviction vacated is entitled to court-appointed assistance of counsel when he
is in such a position as to be unable to employ counsel himself. 9
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Delusive exactness is a constant source of fallacy found throughout the
law."0 The very terms of Section 2255 were set forth, however, in very broad
language. This was done in order to enable the courts to mold and adapt the
law to the individual circumstances of each motion problem raised rather than
to be tied to a statute that defied anything but a strict construction.
Much criticism of the section centers around the extended judicial discre-
tion given to the sentencing court in reviewing the motion, and the fact that
petitioners are not absolutely guaranteed the right to have counsel and be heard
on their motion. The fact that only a "prompt hearing" is granted a party
under the section, while under habeas corpus one is guaranteed a hearing within
five days after the writ is returned, is another inadequacy of Section 2255 pro-
ceedings. Since a petitioner must make his motion to vacate or set aside con-
viction to the sentencing court where all the files, the records, and the witnesses
are located, he is normally left to his own strained devices in obtaining counsel and
preparing his case through the mails, rather than by direct interview. Further, it
is claimed that the sentencing court can usually be expected to be less objective
in passing on the motion than the district court of confinement would be under
the same circumstances."1 While some of this criticism is justified, a large part
of it is based on imagined fears rather than on conclusive evidence of injustice.
Seven proposed solutions to the administrative problems arising under Sec-
tion 2255 may be made: (1) Repeal the section and assign more judges to the
district court of confinement - thereby enabling the petitioner to escape the
traumatic experience of working through the original sentencing court;72 (2)
Have widespread state adoption of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act and, consequently, escape the need for using Section 2255 ;75 (3) Have the
69 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1963).
Both the Campbell and Milani cases have fallen in line with the very recent decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
In a vigorous dissent in Campbell, Judge Knoch noted that the Gideon case did no
more than make explicit something which had, by implication, been in previous Supreme Court
decisions, namely, that in light of the particular circumstances of a case, denial of counsel
would in fact amount to denial of due process. Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion in
the Gideon case said, "Whether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need not now
be decided." 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963). Judge Knoch noted further that, "If the Seventh
Circuit continues to follow this present case, it will have nullified the clear and unambiguous
provisions of Section 2255 respecting study of the motion, files and records of the case to
ascertain whether these conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."
It would thus seem that if the lower federal courts follow the rule of necessity of coun-
sel, as laid down in Gideon, the prior classification of a motion proceeding under § 2255
as an independent civil action would no longer be of any weight or value. See Schiebelhut
v. United States, 318 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1963).
70 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71 Note, Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis and Comparison,
34 ST. JOHN'S L. RV. 81, 95-96 (1959).
72 Id. at 97.
73 1962 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE at 291.
While this Act was approved and recommended by the American Bar Association meet-
ing in Philadelphia, August 25, 1955, only Oregon and Maryland have adopted it.
The four goals of the Uniform Act are: (1) To provide a complete statutory substi-
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petitioning prisoner swear to the genuineness of his claims so embodied in his
motion;7" (4) Employ discovery procedures authorized under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure;" (5) Revise the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;"
(6) Adopt Rule 23 and the accompanying forms as the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois has recently done;" (7) Have the
Federal District Court judges exercise more caution in deciding Section 2255
cases and, at the same time, familiarize themselves thoroughly with the "pitfalls"
of the section's administration.
If Section 2255 were repealed, and even though additional judges were
to be assigned to the district courts of confinement, it is fair to assume that
the situation prior to the 1948 enactment of the section would be upon the
courts once again. As more judges are added, petitions for habeas corpus are
bound to increase fourfold, resulting in rank inefficiency in the administration
of justice. While the Uniform Post Conviction Act, on the surface, looks like
a proper solution to the problems, its provisions are too bold and assertive for
states to grasp. This is apparent when one considers that only two states have
adopted it since the Act was first approved in 1955." Even if a petitioner
falsely swore to the validity of his motion to vacate and were prosecuted as a
result thereof, this would have little deterring significance to him - especially
if he were the average hardened criminal serving a life sentence. Any oppor-
tunity to gain freedom, no matter what the consequence might be for failure,
commends itself to the criminal petitioner.
One of the most difficult problems in this whole area is the court-made
rule that res adjudicata applies only when the precise point presented has been
ruled upon in a prior Section 2255 hearing.80 This problem could be solved
in large part if the discovery techniques under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were to be employed."1 There is really no concrete reason that the
Rules could not be effectively applied, particularly since the prevailing view is
that motions under Section 2255 are civil rather than criminal. If this view-
point were to be adopted, the United States Attorney could easily determine, at
the pre-trial hearing or conference, whether or not the petitioner's contentions
had any real basis with respect to each and every ground for which hearing is
usually provided. In this way, the party would receive but one hearing, and
tute for the various remedies relied on in the past to test the constitutionality of a conviction on
any ground not previously adjudicated. Coram nobis and habeas corpus and their varia-
tions, therefore, are displaced by the Act; (2) To furnish as speedy a proceeding as is pos-
sible, compatible, that is, with orderly judicial processes; (3) To define clearly the scope
of the remedy provided by the Act - thereby assuring the petitioner the full opportunity
to test any charges he may have as regards lack of due process; (4) To bring to a definite
conclusion any further testing after every reasonable opportunity to be heard is afforded
the petitioner.
74 Bowman, Processing A Motion Attacking Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial
Code, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 788, 819 (1963).
75 Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391, 396 (1963).
76 Bowman, supra note 74.
77 Interview with Chief Judge William E. Steckler, The United States District Court,
Southern District, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 2, 1963.
78 Ibid.
79 See supra note 73.
80 Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391, 394 (1963).
81 Id. at 396.
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the possibility of his ever raising other issues in subsequent motions would be
foreclosed.
The proposed revisions to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vide another direct means of alleviating problems within this area. Under the
present rules, automatic denial of a hearing on the claim of a coerced guilty
plea cannot be defended even if the trial court made a detailed attempt to comply
with Federal Criminal Rule 11; but if the proposed amendment is adopted,
this may no longer be true. 2 The proposed revision greatly expands the require-
ments on guilty pleas by requiring the court, before accepting such a plea, to
make "such inquiry as may satisfy it that the defendant in fact committed the
crime."" The court must, accordingly, address the defendant personally to
determine that the plea is a voluntary one."4
Two recent Supreme Court decisions 5 have held that mere failure to comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 32(a), allowing the defendant to make
a statement in his own behalf before sentencing, was not grounds for relief under
Section 2255. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan
dissented in both cases, believing that this was in fact sufficient error to grant
relief under Federal Rule 35. Following these two decisions, amendments
have been proposed both to Rule 32, as well as to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The change in Rule 32 would require the court to
address the defendant personally and ask him if he wished to make a statement
in his own behalf before sentence 8 6 Revised Rule 35, as proposed, would dis-
tinguish between an illegal sentence, which may be corrected at any time, and
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. Under the latter situation, sentence
could be corrected within sixty days after final adjudication of the issues in the
original trial. 7
Perhaps the greatest single achievement in this entire area of administra-
tion under Section 2255 has been the introduction and passage of Rule 23 and
the accompanying forms by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois."8 By filling out the detailed, yet simply-written and easily-
understood forms, it readily appears on the face of the forms themselves whether
the party has a proper cause under the section. " Although the federal district
courts in Indiana have not yet adopted this Illinois rule, general adoption of
the rule would seem to be a step in the right direction in seeking to remedy
82 Bowman, Processing a Motion Attacking Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial
Code, 111 U. PA. L. Rv. 788, 809 (1963).
83 31 F.R.D. 671, 673 (1963).
84 Ibid.
85 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 808 (1962);
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
86 31 F.R.D. 671, 685-86 (1963).
87 Id. at 688.
88 Interview with Chief Judge William E. Stecder, The United States District Court,
Southern District, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 2, 1963.
89 Ibid. An unpublished copy of this Rule and the accompanying forms were received Octo-
ber 11, 1963, through the courtesy of Chief Judge William B. Steckler, United States District
Court, Southern District of Indiana, Judge Orie L. Phillips of the United States Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, and Mr. Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. Since the receipt of this copy, the complete report has been published
in 33 F.R.D. 365 (1963).
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the problems which are encountered when one seeks to move under Section
2255.
Unquestionably, the simplest and most direct answer to the problems con-
nected with Section 2255 would be a thorough familiarization on the part of
Federal District judges with the "pitfalls" of all post conviction remedies,
and particularly the motion-to-vacate proceedings. Coupled with this under-
taking should be a basic re-evaluation of individual court methodology in
the problem area, and a strong resolution to exercise the utmost caution in
passing on such motions."
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It would appear best to allow the federal courts to continue in their
administration of Section 2255 of the Judicial Code since the slight inefficiencies
to be detected under the section are small indeed compared with the magnitude
of those experienced prior to 1948 with habeas corpus petitioners.
In the final analysis, a prisoner's basic right to attack collaterally a convic-
tion is, today, largely unimpaired. If the standards of judicial review set out in
Coppedge v. United States"' were read into Section 2255, the major complaint
as regards the right to counsel and the appeal in forma pauperis would be
satisfactorily corrected. Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's recent statement
on the absolute need of counsel in Section 2255 proceedings,92 it would appear
fairly certain that, as Justice Harlan noted in Gideon v. Wainwright," the basic
right to counsel in all criminal cases has yet to be decided by the Supreme
Court. 4
The words of Mr. Justice Cardozo aptly summarize the hopeful awareness
which the legal scholar and practitioner must have when he considers the prob-
lem of Section 2255 and further realizes that it is but one element in the judicial
process:
The judicial process is one of compromise, a compromise
between paradoxes, between certainty and uncertainty, between
the literalism that is the exaltation of the written word and the
nihilism that is destructive of regularity and order.99
90 Ibid. Chief Judge Steckler noted that as soon as he came to the bench, he under-
took to thoroughly familiarize himself with all the "pitfalls" which he would later encounter
with the post conviction remedies. Judge Steckler's cautious approach, exercised as such to
the point of being over-cautious in fact, has paid off handsomely since the Southern District
in Indiana has not had an overflow of post conviction cases under section 2255. See supra
note 17.
91 369 U.S. 446 (1962).
92 Campbell v. United States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1963); Milani v. United States,
319 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1963).
93 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
94 Id. at 351 (concurring).
95 CooK, A TREASURY OF LEGAL QUOTATioNS 49 (1961).
